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Update README.md
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@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ To achieve compatibility with Apple AirDrop, OpenDrop requires the target platfo
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**Apple Wireless Direct Link.**
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As AirDrop exclusively runs over Apple Wireless Direct Link (AWDL), OpenDrop is only supported on macOS or on Linux systems running
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an open re-implementation of AWDL.
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an open re-implementation of AWDL such as [OWL](https://github.com/seemoo-lab/owl).
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**Libraries.**
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OpenDrop relies on current versions of [OpenSSL](https://www.openssl.org) and [libarchive](https://www.libarchive.org).
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@@ -78,6 +78,17 @@ $ opendrop receive
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```
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## Current Limitations/TODOs
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OpenDrop is the result of a research project and, thus, has several limitations (non-exhaustive list below). I do not have the capacity to work on them myself but am happy to provide assistance if somebody else want to take them on.
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* *Triggering macOS/iOS receivers via Bluetooth Low Energy.* Apple devices start their AWDL interface and AirDrop server only after receiving a custom advertisement via Bluetooth LE (see USENIX paper for details). This means, that Apple AirDrop receivers may not be discovered even if they are discoverable by *everyone*.
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* *Sender/Receiver authentication and connection state.* Currently, there is no peer authentication as in Apple's AirDrop, in particular, (1) OpenDrop does not verify that the TLS certificate is signed by [Apple's root](opendrop/certs/apple_root_ca.pem) and (2) that the Apple ID validation record is correct (see USENIX paper for details). In addition, OpenDrop automatically accepts any file that it receives due to a missing connection state.
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* *Sending multiple files.* Apple AirDrop supports sending multiple files at once, OpenDrop does not (would require adding more files to the archive, modify HTTP /Ask request, etc.).
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## Related Papers
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* Milan Stute, Sashank Narain, Alex Mariotto, Alexander Heinrich, David Kreitschmann, Guevara Noubir, and Matthias Hollick. **A Billion Open Interfaces for Eve and Mallory: MitM, DoS, and Tracking Attacks on iOS and macOS Through Apple Wireless Direct Link.** *28th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security ’19)*, August 14–16, 2019, Santa Clara, CA, USA. [Link](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/stute)
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